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Abstract
Electoral violence is conceived of as violence that occurs contemporaneously with elections, and as vio-
lence that would not have occurred in the absence of an election. While measuring the temporal aspect
of this phenomenon is straightforward, measuring whether occurrences of violence are truly related to
elections is more difficult. Using machine learning, we measure electoral violence across three elections
using disaggregated reporting in social media. We demonstrate that our methodology is more than 30 per-
cent more accurate in measuring electoral violence than previously utilized models. Additionally, we show
that our measures of electoral violence conform to theoretical expectations of this conflict more so than
those that exist in event datasets commonly utilized to measure electoral violence including ACLED,
ICEWS, and SCAD. Finally, we demonstrate the validity of our data by developing a qualitative coding
ontology.
Keywords: Text and content analysis
Elections are the most common means by which citizens select and provide legitimacy to their
political leaders. Unfortunately, electoral politics has become intertwined with violence across
much of the world (Dunning, 2011). Research into the causes of electoral violence has recently
become more systematic, examining the conditions under which incumbents are likely to use vio-
lence to influence the electoral process (Hafner-Burton et al., 2014), the effects of electoral insti-
tutions on electoral violence (Fjelde and Höglund, 2016), and the conditions under which ethnic
diversity contributes to such conflict (Butcher and Goldsmith, 2017).
Despite the increased interest in electoral violence, the concept remains theoretically under-
developed and conceptually vague (Staniland, 2014). Inherent in most definitions of electoral vio-
lence is the temporal link between violence and elections and the causal link between the two.
Electoral violence is conventionally understood as violence that takes place contemporaneously
with the electoral cycle. The causal link, which is often more implicit, limits electoral violence
to that which is in some way connected to the electoral process, as opposed to violence that
takes place during the electoral process but has no direct bearing on the election. We follow
Birch and Muchlinski (2020, 3) who define electoral violence as, “coercive force, directed toward
electoral actors and/or objects, that occurs in the context of electoral competition.”
Electoral violence is often conceptualized at quite high levels of aggregation utilizing blunt cat-
egories including whether there were post-election protests, whether “civilians were killed in sig-
nificant numbers,” and whether government forces harassed opposition candidates (Hyde and
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Marinov, 2012). Most studies of electoral violence tacitly assume that violence which occurs con-
temporaneously with an election is also related to the election, but there are legitimate reasons to
be skeptical. Commonly utilized datasets on this phenomenon are hand coded and conceptual
ambiguity can easily creep into published measures as coders impose their own subjective biases
into the data-generating process (Brass, 1997). While no recorded measure of electoral violence is
free from error, the fact that many measures of this concept rely heavily on the timing of violence
to justify its coding leaves substantial uncertainty regarding whether such violence would still
have occurred in the absence of any election.
Other studies (Daxecker, 2012, 2014) have used disaggregated event datasets such as ACLED
(Raleigh et al., 2010), ICEWS (Boschee et al., 2015), and SCAD (Salehyan et al., 2012) to develop
measures of electoral violence. Because they utilize event-based datasets, these studies may be able
to more accurately assess the relationship between violence and elections by including only, for
instance, violence between opposition and incumbent parties. These datasets, however, which rely
on major international news media reports tend to under estimate the true number of violent
events, introducing another possible source of bias into measures of electoral violence
(Hendrix and Salehyan, 2015; Weidmann, 2015).
We propose utilizing an alternative source of data to develop conceptually clear measurements
of electoral violence. Social media platforms such as Twitter catalog reports on political violence,
and these data have previously been used to predict political instability (Ramakrishnan et al.,
2014). Compared to traditional news reports, Twitter reports on major news events equally
well, but contains a longer tail of minor events often not covered by traditional print media
sources (Jackoway et al., 2011; Petrovic et al., 2013). This study joins a growing field of research
using social media to document conflict dynamics (Doyle et al., 2014; Steinert-Threlkeld et al.,
2015). Most research using social media to estimate political violence has focused on large-scale,
high-intensity violence like civil unrest and violent protest, but no attempt has been made to esti-
mate occurrences of electoral violence using social media.
Our contributions are twofold. Methodologically, we introduce a way to more accurately esti-
mate the link between elections and violence utilizing a convolutional neural network to estimate
a form of political violence directly from unstructured text. While we chose to estimate electoral
violence, our method is general and can be applied to estimate any concept. Substantively, we
demonstrate that the combination of social media data and our machine learning platform devel-
ops more accurate estimates of electoral violence than those that currently exist. This is due to the
superior classification ability of our convolutional neural network. Scholars who adopt our meth-
odology to measure electoral violence will thus be able to draw more statistically valid correlations
between such violence and variables theorized to bring about its occurrence. This is important for
advancing not only scholarly knowledge about this destructive form of conflict, but can also assist
policy makers to forecast this violence and develop policies to ameliorate its effects.
We want to make clear at the outset that we are aware of the possible problems inherent in
utilizing social media as a source of data to measure instances of possible violence around elec-
tions. We are well aware that not all events reported by social media may have actually occurred.
Therefore, we corroborate our estimates of electoral violence using local print media sources. We
also examine the external and concept validity of our estimates by measuring the temporal trends
of violence reported across elections against other established datasets. To be sure our data are
truly related to the elections under study, we qualitatively code events discovered by the neural
network and existing datasets, and compare these results. Finally, we provide in the supplemen-
tary materials evidence documenting each event discovered by our methodology. We are also
aware that our data collection and analysis pipeline depends heavily on individual access to
the Internet and social media. This access is geographically uneven, and is often subject to gov-
ernment censorship. While the methodology proposed here may not be applicable to all elections,
when it can be utilized it is able to estimate electoral violence with a level of detail which is
unmatched.
2 David Muchlinski et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 IP
 a
dd
re
ss
: 2
.9
9.
68
.1
19
, o
n 
10
 S
ep
 2
02
0 
at
 1
5:
26
:2
7,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
 h
tt
ps
:/
/d
oi
.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/p
sr
m
.2
02
0.
32
This paper is structured in the following way. The next section argues existing sources of data
measuring electoral violence do a good job measuring the temporal link between elections and
violence, but the causal link between the two remains ambiguous. We argue that social media
offers a useful alternative source of data to establish this relationship. The next section introduces
our natural language processing model as well as our convolutional neural network. The results
section discusses how our method of detecting events in text enhances estimation of electoral vio-
lence compared to other previously utilized text analysis and machine learning methods. We also
qualitatively demonstrate that our machine learning pipeline is vastly more accurate than existing
datasets in assessing the relationship between electoral violence and the electoral process. We
conclude with some remarks about the use of social media to estimate political violence and
the use of neural networks for the collection of these data.
1. Estimating electoral violence from social media
Using textual sources of data to develop estimates of political violence using automated methods
is not a new endeavor. Datasets like ICEWS are created by fully automated systems built to search
for and record specific events in newswire reports (Boschee et al., 2015). Nor is utilizing social
media data a foreign concept to scholars of political violence. Zeitzoff (2011) collected social
media data from Twitter to analyze temporal violent dynamics between Israel and Hamas during
the 2008–2009 Gaza conflict, and Ramakrishnan et al. (2014) used social media data to forecast
civil unrest across multiple countries.
Thanks to these automated methods and massive sources of textual data, scholars of political
violence now have access to massive datasets measuring political cooperation and conflict. It is
hard to overstate the impact this new form of data has had on the field. It is the size of these
new datasets, with millions of observations coded from international media outlets and spanning
decades, that has allowed scholars to understand the minute details of political violence that pre-
vious data were unable to distinguish. As the collection and use of this text-as-data has proceeded,
however, its limitations have become clearer.
Datasets constructed by automated methods may be systematically under counting the true
number of violent events (Weidmann, 2016; Cook et al., 2017). Media organizations cannot be
everywhere at once. Much political violence occurs where these organizations lack established
bureaus to report these events (Earl et al., 2004). Perpetrators of political violence also go to
some lengths to obfuscate their use of violence to make sure they do not leave a record of
their activity (Zeitzoff, 2011). This is especially likely to affect estimates of electoral violence as
such violence does not often rise to a level which will draw international media attention.
Other datasets utilize reports by international organizations to develop broad measures of
electoral violence (Hyde and Marinov, 2012). These datasets have also done much to improve
our knowledge, but the broad categories with which they measure electoral violence often obscure
the identity of the perpetrators and victims and the tactics employed, misrepresent the nature of
the event itself, or otherwise provide measures of this violence at quite high levels of generality
and aggregation (Staniland, 2014). It can be difficult to determine whether a violent event was
related to an election because reports used to generate these data generally do not report on
each violent event that occurred, but rather describe elections as “generally peaceful,” or “not
peaceful.” As a result, most datasets that measure electoral violence, though they posit a causal
relationship between violence around the election and the electoral contest itself assume this rela-
tionship rather than making it explicit.
This is problematic. While electoral violence is indeed a broad category of violence perpetrated
by many different actors with a diversity of motivations (Staniland, 2014), it is unknown to what
extent current data on these events are actually electoral in nature. Under reporting of this vio-
lence is also another unanswered question. While it is possible to utilize methods to uncover more
empirically accurate distributions of political violence from text (Cook et al., 2017), these
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methods do not provide for us any information about these other events, including whether they
were related to the election.
We propose a solution to these problems by utilizing a different source of data entirely: social
media. Social media networks facilitate collective action for political activity (Larson et al., 2016).
Given the ability of social media to facilitate collective action, the digital footprints left by indi-
viduals involved in these activities provide researchers with relevant data that can be used to dis-
cover the relationship of an event to the election (Schrodt et al., 2013). Social media can also assist
in fleshing out the obscure details of electoral violence where power asymmetries force comba-
tants to utilize nontraditional means of violence which may go unreported by traditional news
organizations (Zeitzoff, 2011).
Given the massive amount of content contained in textual data, automated document classi-
fication has become a popular method of coding information due to its inherent efficiency and
flexibility (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013). Automated methods code massive amounts of informa-
tion regarding political violence, including outbreaks of civil and international conflict (D’Orazio
et al., 2014), and have identified perpetrators of mass atrocities (Bagozzi and Koren, 2017). These
algorithms, including neural networks, have achieved accuracy beyond that of previously utilized
textual analysis methods, such as parsers (Beieler, 2016; Lin et al., 2016).
We hypothesize that the accurate estimation of electoral violence will be enhanced by utilizing
social media and neural networks for two reasons. First, because most event datasets were not
created to measure electoral violence, we expect these datasets to under estimate this violence.
Second, convolutional neural networks have produced state-of-the-art results in many computa-
tional linguistics tasks, out-performing other commonly utilized machine learning methods
(Goldberg, 2016). We argue the combination of disaggregated reporting using social media
and advances in computational linguistics will allow scholars to more accurately estimate the
occurrence of electoral violence. With more accurate discovery of these events, better statistical
models can be constructed to inform scholars of the mechanisms underlying such violence
and its impacts on society.
2. Data collection and preprocessing
We use the publicly available Twitter Streaming API to collect Twitter posts related to electoral
violence. We collected these tweets from a two-month period around elections in three countries:
Venezuela in 2015, Ghana in 2016, and the Philippines in 2016. We chose these countries because
they have some of the largest levels of social media penetration in their respective regions.1 While
tweets collected from the Philippines and Ghana were almost exclusively written in English,
tweets from Venezuela were in Spanish.2 We chose the two-month window in order to analyze
trends in both pre and post-electoral violence, a choice commonly made in the literature (Hyde
and Marinov, 2012; Hafner-Burton et al., 2014).
We utilized a keyword search related to the election and electoral violence. A table with the
keywords utilized in our search is given in the supplementary materials. Because the size of
the tweet-based datasets resulting from this keyword search are very large, we used a computer-
ized platform to select a random sample of tweets from each country and manually code them.
1For instance, Venezuela’s social media penetration (the percentage of Internet users who use social media) is 68 percent,
the Philippine’s social media penetration is 37 percent, and Ghana’s social media penetration is 40 percent; https://www.sta-
tista.com/statistics/754520/venezuela-penetration-social-networks/, https://cliqafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/2016-
Final-Ghana-Social-Media-Rankings-Report-CliQAfrica-Ltd.pdf, https://www.statista.com/statistics/490378/mobile-messa-
ging-user-reach-philippines/, accessed 14 May 2018).
2For the purposes of coding the training data, Spanish tweets were automatically translated into English. Quality of the
automatic translations were checked by two Spanish speakers, one author who is fluent in Spanish, and another native
speaker.
4 David Muchlinski et al.
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Each author coded the same random sample of tweets, and a report of inter-coder reliability is
provided in the supplementary materials. In total, our Venezuela election training data consist
of a random sample of 5747 Spanish tweets. The Philippine training data consisted of a random
sample of 4163 English tweets. The training data for the election in Ghana consisted of 3235
English tweets. A table with the statistics of these samples is provided in the supplementary mate-
rials. Tweets were hand-coded according to a two-tier classification scheme. First, a tweet was
coded as election related or not election related. Then, out of those tweets that were coded as
related to the election, a tweet was further coded as referencing violence or not. Thus, all tweets
that were coded as violent were coded as violent with respect to the election. This two tired ontol-
ogy ensured that all tweets labeled as violent referenced electoral violence rather than other forms
of violence that were not related to the election. These hand coded data were used to train the
convolutional neural network. To collect tweets, we adopt an informational retrieval and pooling
methodology (Voorhees and Harman, 2005) as shown in Figure 1.
The keyword search collected a large number of tweets each day. In order to manually code
them, we used a search and pooling methodology to identify a reduced set that were mostly likely
to be concerned with electoral violence for each day. In particular, we used the Terrier informa-
tion retrieval platform (Ounis et al., 2006; Macdonald et al., 2012) to rank tweets that well match
a set of electoral violence related search terms.3 In particular, we configured Terrier to rank tweets
using the DFReeKLIM weighting model (Amati et al., 2011), which is specifically designed for the
analysis of text-sparse Twitter data. In this way we constructed three training datasets collected
from each of the three countries. We did this for each election so that there is one training dataset
of tweets for the Venezuela election, one for the Ghanaian election, and one for the Philippine
election. While our natural language processing model allows for multilingual data sources, we
assume that there may be systematic differences in the ways in which people tweeted about elec-
tions in each country, therefore the neural network was trained separately for each election.
2.1 Data preprocessing using word embeddings
Once the training datasets were collected, they were preprocessed to remove stopwords and cap-
italization and stemmed using the English and Spanish Snowball stemmer. Then the hand-labeled
tweets used to train the neural network were transformed into real-valued vectors to produce
word embeddings (Collobert et al., 2011; Mikolov et al., 2013). The software used to create
these embeddings is called word2vec and is freely available.4 Because word embeddings have
not widely been utilized as a natural language processing tool in political science, a quick explan-
ation is in order.
The commonly utilized method to transform words into numeric vectors is to assign each
word a one-hot vector in < V| |, where |V| is the vocabulary size of the text. Repeating this process
for all words across n documents results in the creation of a V ×N document-term matrix where
words that appear in a given document are given a value of 1, and 0 otherwise. Representing
words in this way leads to substantial data sparsity, increasing the data required in order to
train statistical models (Mandelbaum and Shalev, 2016). The one-hot encoding of words also dis-
cards much linguistic information regarding the surrounding syntactic and semantic context of a
given word in a sentence. Methods that can retain this kind of information are able to use this
information to increase classification accuracy (Bengio et al., 2003; Collobert et al., 2011).
One such natural language processing method is word embeddings. Word embeddings are a
set of language modeling and feature leaning techniques where words and phrases from the
vocabulary of the textual data are mapped to vectors of real numbers (Collobert et al., 2011;
Mikolov et al., 2013). The basic idea behind word embeddings is to create a more meaningful
3Terrier is available from http://terrier.org. We used version 4.1, but any more recent version would also be suitable.
4The website hosting this software is https://deeplearning4j.org/.
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numeric representation of the text that contains both information regarding the word itself
as well as information regarding the linguistic context of that word.
In word2vec, word embeddings are randomly generated by maximizing the average log prob-
ability of the linguistic context c given word w (Goldberg and Levy, 2014). Rather than consider
words as atomized features to be represented as a series of ones or zeros, word2vec transforms
these sparse word representations into dense real-valued vectors.
Conceptually, the contextual meaning of a word is not determined by viewing a word in iso-
lation; one also needs an understanding of the surrounding linguistic context. Word embeddings
are assigned a real-valued vector such that words which appear in similar contexts cluster
together in the embedding space. The assignment of vector values to words and the dimensions
of the embedding space are meaningful only in the context of the embeddings themselves. While
each word is given a vector representation, the values of these vectors have no valuation attached
to them. Words like violence, death, and assault will cluster together in the embedding space
because word2vec recognizes that these words co-occur more frequently together than do other
words like fraud, cheat, or vote. This allows our neural network to learn not only which
words are predictive of electoral violence, but also to learn other words in similar contexts
that also report on violent events. Some visualizations of word embedding space are provided
in the supplementary materials.
3. Describing the convolutional neural network
Convolutional neural networks are quite complex, and the number of hyperparameters that are
used to train the network can represent an extreme case of Gelman and Loken (2013)’s “garden
of forking paths.” This section introduces the basic components of our neural network and explains
their functions. A secondary subsection describes our parameterization of the neural network.5
Figure 1. The information retrieval and pooling methodology used to generate tweet-based datasets.
5Replication code and data for this research can be found at: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?
persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/KFVTMI. We wish to note that there is substantial debate surrounding the extent to
which complicated methodologies which rely on the setting of multiple hyper-parameters and even starting seed values,
like neural networks, replicate exactly the same every time (Ferro et al., 2016; Ferro and Kelly, 2018; Muchlinski et al.,
2019). Though perhaps the exact number of events discovered, the number of tweets captured, and metric values may differ
during future replications, the neural network will out-perform the support vector machine if our methodology is followed.
6 David Muchlinski et al.
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Neural networks apply non-linear transformations to the input data, allowing nearly any rela-
tionship between the response and predictor variables. This makes neural networks ideal tools for
textual analysis tasks as they can learn functional mapping between any word in a vocabulary and
the probability that a text references a violent event. Given we do not assume to know the entire
vocabulary which is predictive of such events, we allow the neural network to learn these linguis-
tic features directly from the data itself. Here we introduce the basics of neural networks and
expand these fundamentals to describe our convolutional neural network in the following
subsections.
3.1 The basics of a neural network
A neural network used for the classification of a binary variable is a nonlinear and interactive
extension of the familiar logistic regression model (Beck et al., 2000). Logistic regression fits
one function to estimate the relationship between a dataset of features X and the probability
that a tweet references a violent event, call this πi. A neural network can fit N approximations
of this relationship. Statistically, we begin by assuming the data Y, which represents observations
regarding electoral violence, are defined according to a known statistical distribution.
Yi  Bernoulli
The standard logistic regression model expresses the relationship between X and π as
pi = logit(Xib) = 11+ e−Xib ,
where i denotes the i-th tweet in the dataset. A neural network extends the logistic regression
model in the following way:
pi = logit[g0 + g1logit(Xib1)+ g2logit(Xib2)+ · · · + gN logit(XibN)]. (1)
pi = logit[g0 + g1logit(p1)+ g2logit(p2)+ · · · + gN logit(pN)]. (2)
The γ terms in these equations are weights representing how much confidence the network
attaches to a probability estimate of electoral violence. More generally, we can write the weighted
product of γnπn as a single weight matrix W, and replace the logistic functional form with a more
general form x. Rewriting Equations 1 and 2 with more general notation, we obtain:
f (x) = pi = x1W1 + · · · + xnWn. (3)
The functional form x is estimated directly from the data by computation units in the network
called “neurons.” Neurons are mathematical functions that apply nonlinear transformations of
the data to various parts of the network. In our network, we use a type of neuron called a
Rectified Linear Unit or ReLU, which passes tweets to other layers of the network if and only
if the neuron receives sufficient evidence that a given tweet references electoral violence. The net-
work learns which linguistic features of a tweet reference violence through its learning procedure,
called backpropagation, which passes errors in classification backward through the network. This
backpropagation provides the neurons with information regarding whether a tweet was misclas-
sified or correctly classified. If a tweet was correctly classified, the information passed to the neu-
rons by backpropagation does not substantially alter the weight matrix for a tweet. If, however, a
tweet was misclassified, the neural network will update its information regarding which features
Political Science Research and Methods 7
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are indicative of electoral violence, attaching different weight to different features. This process
continues by gradient descent until a global minimum is reached.
3.2 Explaining the convolutional neural network
A neural network like the one outlined above represents the simplest architecture of a neural net-
work. Convolutional neural networks apply further transformations to the data. These transfor-
mations are applied in different layers of the network. Our convolutional neural network is based
upon the architecture described in Kim (2014) and Severyn and Moschitti (2015), and consists of
a convolutional layer, a max pooling layer, a dropout layer, and a softmax layer. Each of these are
explained in turn. To facilitate ease of understanding, a diagram of our network is presented in
Figure 2. Our neural network was run using a standard Windows desktop computer with an Intel
CPU 3.6 GHz i7 processor and 16 GB of RAM. Such a setup is readily available and inexpensive,
making this methodology competitive with current event data projects in political science.
3.2.1 The convolutional layer
Consider the tweet “Ten people are dead in election day violence.” A vectorized representation of
this tweet generated from word2vec is input to the first layer of the network, the convolutional
layer. This layer passes a series of filters over the tweet. These filters read the tweet, learning
which features indicate whether or not a tweet references violence by generating a series of feature
maps. These are d-dimensional vectors of tweet features—in essence vectorized words or n-grams
—that are learned to be representative of violence. To take the example shown in Figure 2, three
feature maps may be generated from this tweet. The first is “ten people dead,” the second is “dead
in election,” and the third is the word “violence.” These feature maps can be different lengths and
are generated endogenously. They are passed to the next layer of the network, the Max Pooling
Layer, which concatenates these features maps together, then reduces them into a sparser, but
more easily learned, representation.
3.2.2 The max pooling layer
The feature maps generated by the convolutional layer are diverse. Variation in the length of the
feature maps may increase computation time and reduce classification accuracy as the network
has a greater number of parameters to learn. The max pooling layer uses dimensionality reduc-
tion to concatenate the feature maps into a single vector, then removes all but the most salient
Figure 2. Visual depiction of the convolutional neural network adapted from Kim (2014).
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features of these maps, speeding up computation time by reducing the number of features the
network has to learn.
In our example, the max pooling layer takes the three feature maps generated by the convo-
lutional layer: “ten people dead,” “dead in election,” “violence,” and reduces them into a smaller
vector that reads “people dead violence.” Though this reduced tweet is not grammatically correct,
it greatly assists the neural network to classify such a tweet as referencing violence. As error rates
are passed back through the max pooling layer by backpropagation, fewer weight matrices are
updated—because there are fewer words in the tweet—and the neural network will learn this
“tweet” references violence more quickly and accurately than if it had to update weights for all
features in the longer tweet “ten people dead in election day violence.”
3.2.3 Dropout and softmax layers
The dropout layer acts like an ensemble learner. With a certain probability p it keeps a set of neu-
rons in the network active and switches the others off. We set p equal to 0.5 such that through
each iteration of training, the network used a randomly selected half of its computational units to
classify tweets. This allows us to avoid overfitting. At the end of the training procedure, the results
of training are averaged over all training iterations. Since each training iteration used a random
configuration of neurons, our training results represent the weighted average of thousands of net-
work configurations, reducing bias. We further used L2 regularization to control overfitting.
The softmax layer is the final output layer. It uses a variation of the logistic function to classify the
tweets passed by the max pooling layer into mutually exclusive categories of electoral violence or not
electoral violence. Concluding with our running example, the concatenated tweet “people dead vio-
lence” is passed from the max pooling to the softmax layer. The softmax layer compares the features
in this reduced-form tweet—“people dead violence”—to the hand coded class label and assigns a
probability to the category of violence. Once this probability is assigned, backpropagation updates
the weight matrices for each individual feature in the reduced tweet to reflect new information
that features like “people,” “dead,” and “violence” are predictive of the class of violence.
3.3 The parameterization of our neural network and word embedding model
To train the convolutional neural network and support vector machine, we use five fold cross-
validation, such that in each fold, three partitions are used for training, one partition for valid-
ation, and one partition for test. Afterward, the overall performance on the test instances is
assessed by averaging the scores across all folds. The support vector machine was initialized
using the LinearSVC model in the Python Scikit-learn library (Pedregosa et al., 2011) and the
parameter c was tuned using five fold cross-validation. Our neural network was also coded in
Python using the Tensorflow library (Abadi et al., 2016). For all the experiments conducted
with the neural network, we use three filter sizes m = {1, 2, 3}, stride s = 1, window size W =
{1, 5, 10}, and the dimension size of the word embedding model was set to D = {200, 500,
800}. For each filter size, 200 filters are applied to the convolutional layer, producing 600 feature
maps in total. Window size set to 10 and embedding size equal to 800 produced the best results,
so we set those values as default parameter values for all elections. For our word embedding
model, we set the batch size to 50, minimum word frequency to 5 and iterations to 5. As the dis-
tribution of tweet classes were imbalanced, we also set negative sampling to 10 as an additional
parameter and conduct experiments by varying negative sampling size ns = {2, 10}. The class
imbalance in the training data is shown in the supplementary materials. We note here that tweets
describing electoral violence are between 5 and 6 percent of all tweets across all three elections. To
correct for this class imbalance, a weighted cross-entropy loss function was used to give a larger
weight to the minority class for the neural network. For the support vector machine, we set the
class weights parameter of the model to “balanced” in the Scikit-Learn library.
Political Science Research and Methods 9
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 IP
 a
dd
re
ss
: 2
.9
9.
68
.1
19
, o
n 
10
 S
ep
 2
02
0 
at
 1
5:
26
:2
7,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
 h
tt
ps
:/
/d
oi
.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/p
sr
m
.2
02
0.
32
Robustness tests of our results across various combinations of window size and word embed-
ding dimension sizes, are extensively covered in Tables 3 and 4 of Yang et al. (2018) for the
Venezuelan election and the Philippine election, respectively. Robustness tests displaying the
results of varying the negative sampling size are reported in Table 5 of Yang et al. (2018).6
The neural network consistently outperforms the support vector machine as measured by the
F-1 score across every window size and every dimension size of the word embedding model
for both elections.
4. Results: estimating electoral violence
Here we describe the classification accuracy of our neural network compared to a baseline, derive
the total number of violent events for each election, and compare the number of events discov-
ered by our neural network to those reported in other event datasets including ACLED, ICEWS,
and SCAD. We chose a support vector machine for the baseline model because this algorithm has
been shown to accurately classify textual data referencing various forms of political violence
(D’Orazio et al., 2014). We further ensure that the events our neural network has discovered actu-
ally occurred using two methods. First, by verifying the veracity of each event using local media
sources. Tweets reporting violent events often contain other media, including linked news reports
that we can independently verify. The second is to create a qualitative coding ontology which we
apply to all data estimated by our neural network as well as all violent data occurring during the
two-month electoral period in ACLED, ICEWS, and SCAD. Qualitatively coding these data gives
us greater insight into whether a violent event that occurred was causally related to the election.
To code this information qualitatively, we rely on linked news stories in our tweets, but because
we do not have access to the textual sources underlying the data in the other datasets, we are
forced to make judgments about how likely these events were related to the election.7
We use several metrics to compare classification accuracy between the neural network and
support vector machine including precision, recall, and the F-1 score. Precision, is defined
as true positives/(true positives + false positives), while recall is given by true positives/(true
positives + false negatives). The F-1 score is the harmonic mean of precision and recall.
To briefly summarize, we find that our neural network more accurately classifies tweets that
report actual electoral violence compared to a support vector machine. The neural network iden-
tifies thousands more violent tweets in the data, allowing us to discover many violent events that
would have gone undiscovered by utilizing other methods. We further find substantial concept
validity of our data by measuring the temporal distribution of electoral violence and by qualita-
tively coding our observations.
4.1 Comparing classification accuracy
After the neural network and support vector machine were trained, the parameters of each algo-
rithm are saved, and classification accuracy is assessed using a hold-out test dataset of tweets.
Because each model was trained separately for each election, test set accuracy was also assessed
for each election separately. Table 1 compares the classification accuracy of the neural network
compared to the support vector machine. Because it combines information from both precision
and recall, we utilize the F-1 score as our primary metric of classification accuracy. As is clear
6The article containing our robustness checks, though written by some of our coauthors does not have the same focus as
this manuscript. Yang et al. (2018) examined the ability of a convolutional neural network to accurately classify tweets related
to electoral violence and malpractice. This was a purely experimental paper, and the current manuscript has the empirical
goal of extending the work of Yang et al. (2018) by comparing the classification ability of the neural network and support
vector machines to prominent datasets in political science which have been used to study electoral violence.
7ACLED and SCAD contain some notes about each event taken from the underlying text, and we use these notes to assist
our qualitative coding of that data as well.
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from the table, the neural network more accurately discovers electoral violence in social media as
shown by the higher F-1 scores across all elections. These differences, further, are statistically
significant using McNemar’s test for the elections in the Philippines (p = 0.0153) and
Venezuela (p = 0.0218), but are not significant for the Ghanaian election (p = 0.0736)
Compared to the support vector machine’s performance on the entire tweet-level data (train-
ing and test sets), the neural network identifies 27,282 (47 percent) additional tweets referencing
violence during the Venezuelan election, 1135 (13 percent) additional tweets for the Philippine
election, and 18,868 (76 percent) tweets for the Ghanaian election. These are large numbers,
and it is likely that among these tens of thousands of additional tweets, there are tweets referen-
cing violent events that the support vector machine has not discovered.
In effect, this replicates under-reporting bias all over again. Given the support vector
machine fails to identify over 40,000 tweets that actually report on violent events, we cannot
be confident that this method will be able to provide an accurate accounting of the total number
of such events for each election. However, it may also be the case that the neural network is
simply producing many more false positives. What is needed is a way to determine if the
two algorithms detect a different number of violent events, rather than simply detecting a dif-
ferent number of tweets referencing violence. If the tweets classified by the neural network refer-
ence a larger number of violent events, we can more accurately determine the level of electoral
violence for each election.
4.2 Discovering the number of violent events with clustering
Because multiple tweets may report on the same event, counting each tweet as a single event
would provide an inflated estimate of violence across our three elections. To discover how
many events actually occurred we utilize K-means clustering which partitions observations
into k clusters, where k is chosen by the researcher. For each election, we set k = 100, 100
being a large enough number such that all violent events could potentially be observed.8 With
word embeddings, tweets which report on the same event will contain similar linguistic informa-
tion, and thus have similar numerical values. Tweets with similar values will cluster closely
together, while tweets reporting on different events should cluster further away in the data
space. Partitioning this space into clusters assists in the discovery of individual violent events.
The results of our clustering analysis are shown in Table 2, which shows the number of events
discovered by each algorithm across all elections, as well as the difference in events discovered
between the neural network and the support vector machine. The neural network discovers an
additional 15 violent events in Venezuela, 11 in the Philippines, and 3 in Ghana compared to
the support vector machine.
Table 1. Classification accuracy for electoral violence tweets
Country Classifier Precision Recall F-1
Venezuela SVM 71.3 72.0 71.5
CNN 74.3 75.4 74.6
Philippines SVM 67.1 76.1 70.9
CNN 78.7 74.0 75.9
Ghana SVM 75.1 77.6 76.0
CNN 82.6 72.9 77.1
8The exact choice of k in our analysis does not matter as long as it is sufficiently large to capture all relevant events. The
idea is to have a reasonable number of clusters for authors to manually validate the events. A small number will lead to clus-
ters with mixed events but a very large number will necessitate that researchers spend more time to check the homogeneity of
event clusters. For some experiments demonstrating how the choice of k affects inter- and intra-tweet cluster homogeneity,
see the supplementary materials.
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4.3 Electoral violence in social media: measuring concept validity
Here we examine the concept validity of our estimates of electoral violence by examining
temporal trends in violence during each election compared to that of violent events recorded
in other established event datasets including ACLED, ICEWS, and SCAD. The objective of elect-
oral violence is to influence the electoral process (Höglund, 2009). Because violence can be
strategically deployed to affect voting patterns, electoral violence tends to increase in frequency
as election-day approaches (Harish and Little, 2017). Therefore, we should expect to discover
an increase in violence in the days immediately surrounding each election, as electoral actors
strategically deploy violence in order to affect the results of the election according to their
particular ends.
Figure 3 shows temporal trends in violence across all three elections. The temporal trends dis-
covered by our neural network are quite different from those recorded elsewhere. This suggests
that our method detects a different type of violence. For each election, our neural network detects
substantial increases in electoral violence in the days immediately surrounding each election
(election day is represented as 0 on the x-axis), a trend no other dataset picks up, except for
ACLED in the Ghanaian election. This suggests that our estimates of electoral violence have
good concept validity. By measuring violence that peaks on election-day, our algorithm is accur-
ately estimating political violence that is directly related to the electoral process.
4.4 Qualitatively coding electoral violence
To ensure the neural network has discovered violent events that are correlated with the electoral
process, we developed a qualitative coding ontology of all events discovered by our neural net-
work as well as all events recorded by ACLED, ICEWS, and SCAD. We separate events into
six mutually exclusive categories: strongly related to the election, probably related to the election,
probably not related to the election, not related to the election, related to the election but not
violent, and the final category being not enough information to code. We develop a qualitative
codebook to separate events into these mutually exclusive categories. It is available in the supple-
mentary materials. For data collected by our neural network, we relied on linked news articles to
determine the association of each event to each election. When tweets contained no linked news
article, we could not determine if there was sufficient information to determine the causal relation
of an event to the election.
Events were coded as strongly related to the election if at least one actor had strong connec-
tions to the electoral process, such as being a political party or activist, and if it could be corro-
borated through a description of the event that the motive for the violence was related to the
election.9 Events are probably related to the election if at least one actor could be linked to the
electoral process, but if the motive for engaging in the violence remained unclear. Events for
Table 2. Number of violent events per election
Country Classifier Number of violent events Difference
Venezuela SVM 32
CNN 47 + 15
Philippines SVM 36
CNN 47 + 11
Ghana SVM 42
CNN 45 + 3
9ICEWS, which is the only alternative source of event data for two elections, does not contain any additional descriptions
of events, like notes, which can be used to get a better understanding of the event. Fortunately, ACLED and SCAD do contain
such information, and we use this additional data to assist in our qualitative coding of data from ACLED.
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Fig. 3. Temporal trends of electoral violence.
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which the identity of either actor is ambiguous (i.e., “vigilante militia,” or “civilians”) and for
which the motive is unclear are coded as probably not related to the election. Events are
coded as not related to the election if no actor has an identification that can be clearly traced
to the electoral process, and if the motive for the incident is clearly not related to the election.
Events could also be coded as related to the election, but the event was not violent in nature.
An example would be if members of a political party staged a rally, and no violence broke
out. Finally, there were often events which could not be corroborated using alternative sources
of data, or the identity of at least one actor was completely unknown (i.e., the identity of the
perpetrator or victim in ACLED, ICEWS, or SCAD was left blank). These events were coded
as not having enough information to code.
The qualitative coding of the data collected by our neural network confirms our earlier results,
with an important caveat. The neural network is able to determine with a high degree of confi-
dence whether events are correlated with the electoral process, but only for English language
tweets. For the Venezuela election, there is little difference in the percentage of tweets qualita-
tively classified as strongly or probably related to the election compared to ICEWS or our neural
network. We discovered 47 violent incidents, compared to 16 recorded by ICEWS. The propor-
tions of events that are related to the election among the two datasets, however, are similar. The
neural network suggests that 53 percent of events discovered are strongly or probably related to
the Venezuelan election. By contrast, 56 percent of events in ICEWS fall into the same two cat-
egories. While our neural network detects a greater number of violent events, it does no better at
classifying the relationship of those events to the electoral process.
When the neural network is trained on English language tweets, however, it is able to far
surpass other datasets in determining which violent events are related to the electoral process.
These results are shown in Table 3. For instance, our qualitative coding of the Philippine election
demonstrates most recorded violence in ICEWS is not related to the electoral process. ICEWS
records 106 violent events, compared to 51 discovered by our neural network. Seventy-eight per-
cent of all events recorded by the neural network during the Philippine election are either
strongly or probably related to the election. By contrast, only 7 percent of all observations
recorded in ICEWS could be considered to be probably election related, and no event could
be considered to be strongly related to the election. The vast majority of violence contained in
ICEWS are false positives reporting the killings of drug dealers or users, or military actions
against rebel groups like Abu Sayyaf. The first category of events are clearly unrelated to the elec-
tion. The second could plausibly be related to the electoral process, but the insurgency against
such rebels has long predated the 2016 election, so such violence is quite unlikely to have electoral
causes.
Similar results hold for the election in Ghana. Our neural network discovered 45 violent
events, compared to 29 in ACLED, 2 in ICEWS, and 3 in SCAD.10 ACLED does a comparatively
good job in correctly identifying electoral violence. It suggests 44 percent of the 29 events are
strongly or probably related to the election. Our neural network, however, is twice as accurate
in correctly identifying true positives. ACLED incorrectly classifies 40 percent of its events as
violent when there is considerable evidence in ACLED itself to suggest they were peaceful.
Adding the additional 16 percent of events that are not related to the election, ACLED’s false
positive rate is 56 percent—12 percent higher than its true positive rate.
These results demonstrate that our machine learning platform is vastly more accurate in cor-
rectly identifying electoral violence as compared to existing event datasets. This suggests statistical
models of electoral violence developed using these event datasets should be interpreted with
caution because rates of misclassification on the dependent variable appear to be substantial.
Scholars working in this field may wish to utilize alternative sources of information to measure
electoral violence. Social media is one useful source of text, but many more may exist. Finally, our
10We report only the comparison with ACLED in Table 3 due to these small sample sizes.
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results show that the choice of machine learning algorithm matters for measuring violent events
in text. The support vector machine possibly under counted the true rate of violence during these
three elections, contributing to another possible source of statistical bias. While we have demon-
strated our neural network is able to estimate electoral violence more accurately than existing
methods, our machine learning method can be applied to different, and much broader, classes
of political phenomena. While convolutional neural networks can be quite complex, they are use-
ful to the broader community of political methodologists or any researcher who simply wishes to
measure data developed from unstructured text more accurately.
5. Conclusions
Election-related violence plagues countries around the world. It impedes the peaceful transition of
power and can prevent citizens from exercising their constitutionally protected rights to choose
their elected leaders. Despite a proliferation of recent research into this phenomenon, the concept
of electoral violence still remains ill-defined and most studies assume, rather than validate, that
violence occurring during elections actually seeks to affect the electoral process in some way. We
have developed a new method to collect, code, and validate data mined from social media to esti-
mate trends in electoral violence during three elections in different countries. We have demon-
strated that our machine learning pipeline more accurately measures electoral violence compared
to existing datasets and other state of the art machine learning algorithms. We show that the
trends in violence uncovered by our neural network peak on or near election day, and we dem-
onstrate through qualitative coding that the data we have collected have a stronger causal connec-
tion to the electoral process compared to existing data in ACLED, ICEWS, and SCAD.
Electoral violence can take a variety of forms, is perpetrated by many different actors, and
often falls short of erupting into full-fledged civil conflict. Thus, it can be difficult to correlate
the presence of any violent event that occurs to the election itself. We have provided scholars
with a method of moving past this technical barrier. Because it is a more direct type of reporting,
often from observers of the event itself, social media may offer a more straight forward way to
discover violent events. We have shown that word embeddings, further, provide machine learning
classifiers greater accuracy in identifying instances of violence in text. These tools currently show
the most promise in enhancing natural language processing pipelines, like ours, and classifiers
trained using such embeddings have proven to be more accurate than commonly utilized tools
across the discipline (Beieler, 2016). Our results demonstrate that word embeddings outperform
traditional bag-of-words approaches to textual analysis. The ability of word embeddings to
encode not just about the word itself, but its linguistic relationship to other parts of the text,
enhances classification accuracy, assisting the discovery of violent events. Our neural network
classifier, further, has been demonstrated to be a more accurate algorithm for identifying
instances of violence in social media text compared to other machine learning algorithms, like
support vector machines, that have previously been utilized for similar tasks.
We are aware of the limitations of our methodology. Because we derive our data on electoral
violence from social media, Internet and social media access is a prerequisite for measuring
Table 3. Rates of qualitative classification for each election according to different datasets
Election Strongly Probably Probably not Not related Not violence No info
Venezuela (NN) 0.33 0.20 0.04 0.09 0.15 0.20
Venezuela (ICEWS) 0.06 0.50 0.19 0.25 0.00 0.00
Philippines (NN) 0.53 0.25 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.10
Philippines (ICEWS) 0.00 0.07 0.08 0.74 0.00 0.10
Ghana (NN) 0.66 0.18 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.07
Ghana (ACLED) 0.40 0.04 0.00 0.16 0.40 0.00
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electoral violence. Scholars utilizing our methodology will not be able to measure electoral vio-
lence in countries where citizen access to the Internet is limited. Scholars must also remain vigi-
lant against the spread of misinformation throughout social media networks, and validate the
information they gather against alternative sources. The performance of our methodology may
deteriorate somewhat in countries where English is not the primary language used across social
media platforms. Further application of this methodology to multilingual datasets of tweets is
warranted to resolve this possible limitation.
Our results also demonstrate that the granularity by which media is reported matters. Both
ACLED and our neural network utilize national, regional, and local reporting sources. Of the
three event datasets, ACLED seems to be more accurate in identifying electoral violence, though
it is extremely difficult to determine if this result would hold across additional elections. Because
ACLED does not contain data on Venezuela or the Philippines for this time period, a more thor-
ough comparison is not possible within the scope of this project. While ACLED is the most
accurate in identifying the nature of electoral violence, it is interesting to note that our neural
network discovered 14 additional violent events during the Ghanaian election. A detailed analysis
of why our neural network discovered more events, even holding the locality of news reporting
more or less constant, is unfortunately outside the scope of this project. Despite our ignorance on
this issue, we can heartily advise scholars to, where possible, utilize the most disaggregated source
of reporting that is relevant for their research needs.
Perhaps unexpectedly, we have also uncovered a result suggesting that the choice of algo-
rithm used to discover violent events in text matters. Given the inherent costs of failing to
accurately diagnose potential conflicts, including electoral violence, we suggest scholars utilize
the most accurate methods available to ameliorate any possible source of under-reporting bias.
Though neural networks are quite complex, and the process by which they produce their esti-
mates are a subject of much current research, they are worth using for tasks in which the box of
causality can remain black. If researchers only wish to recover the most accurate estimates of
violence from text, it makes sense to use the most accurate method. Of course a sophisticated
machine learning algorithm cannot substitute for the watchful eye of an expert researcher, but it
can be a powerful tool in the right hands. Given our success in estimating electoral violence, we
invite scholars of political violence more generally to embrace this new technology and take a
dive in the deep end.
Supplementary material. To view supplementary material for this article, please visit https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2020.32
Acknowledgements. We are very grateful to Patrick Brandt, Vito D’Orazio, Ben Bagozzi, the other participants at the APSA
Event Data Mini-Conference Program 2018, and the PSRM reviewers and editors for very helpful comments on previous
versions of this article. The authors acknowledge support from the Economic and Social Research Council, Grant No. ES/
L016435/1.
References
Abadi M, Barham P, Chen J, Chen Z, Davis A, Dean J, Devin M, Ghemawat S, Irving G, Isard M and Kudlur M (2016)
Tensorflow: a system for large-scale machine learning. OSDI 16, 265–283.
Amati G, Amodeo G, Bianchi M, Marcone G, Bordoni FU, Gaibisso C, Gambosi G, Celi A, Di Nicola C and Flammini M
(2011) FUB, IASI-CNR, UNIVAQ at TREC 2011 microblog track. In Proceedings of TREC.
Bagozzi BE and Koren O (2017) Using machine learning methods to identify atrocity perpetrators. In 2017 IEEE
International Conference on Big Data.
Beck N, King G and Zeng L (2000) Improving quantitative studies of international conflict: a conjecture. American Political
Science Review 94, 21–35.
Beieler J (2016) Generating politically-relevant event data. arXiv preprint arXiv:1609.06239.
Bengio Y, Ducharme R, Vincent P and Janvin C (2003) A neural probabilistic language model. Journal of Machine Learning
Research 3, 1137–1155.
Birch S and Muchlinski D (2020) The dataset of countries at risk of electoral violence. Terrorism and Political Violence 32(2),
217–236.
16 David Muchlinski et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 IP
 a
dd
re
ss
: 2
.9
9.
68
.1
19
, o
n 
10
 S
ep
 2
02
0 
at
 1
5:
26
:2
7,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
 h
tt
ps
:/
/d
oi
.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/p
sr
m
.2
02
0.
32
Boschee E, Lautenschlager J, O’Brien S, Shellman S, Starz J and Ward M (2015) Icews coded event data. Harvard
Dataverse 12.
Brass PR (1997) Theft of an Idol: Text and Context in the Representation of Collective Violence. Princeton University Press.
Butcher C and Goldsmith BE (2017) Elections, ethnicity, and political instability. Comparative Political Studies 50, 1390–
1419.
Collobert R, Weston J, Bottou L, Karlen M, Kavukcuoglu K and Kuksa P (2011) Natural language processing (almost)
from scratch. Journal of Machine Learning Research 12, 2493–2537.
Cook SJ, Blas B, Carroll RJ and Sinha S (2017) Two wrongs make a right: addressing underreporting in binary data from
multiple sources. Political Analysis 25, 223–240.
Daxecker UE (2012) The cost of exposing cheating: international election monitoring, fraud, and post-election violence in
Africa. Journal of Peace Research 49, 503–516.
Daxecker UE (2014) All quiet on election day? International election observation and incentives for pre-election violence in
African elections. Electoral Studies 34, 232–243.
D’Orazio V, Landis ST, Palmer G and Schrodt P (2014) Separating the wheat from the chaff: applications of automated
document classification using support vector machines. Political Analysis 22(2), 224–242.
Doyle A, Katz G, Summers K, Ackermann C, Zavorin I, Lim Z, Muthiah S, Butler P, Self N, Zhao L, et al. (2014)
Forecasting significant societal events using the embers streaming predictive analytics system. Big Data 2, 185–195.
Dunning T (2011) Fighting and voting: violent conflict and electoral politics. Journal of Conflict Resolution 55, 327–339.
Earl J, Martin A, McCarthy JD and Soule SA (2004) The use of newspaper data in the study of collective action. Annual
Review of Sociology 30, 65–80.
Ferro N and Kelly D (2018) SIGIR initiative to implement ACM artifact review and badging. In ACM SIGIR Forum, vol. 52,
ACM, pp. 4–10.
Ferro N, Fuhr N, Järvelin K, Kando N, Lippold M and Zobel J (2016) Increasing reproducibility in IR: findings from the
Dagstuhl seminar on “reproducibility of data-oriented experiments in e-science.” In SIGIR Forum, vol. 50, pp. 68–82.
Fjelde H and Höglund K (2016) Electoral institutions and electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa. British Journal of
Political Science 46, 297–320.
Gelman A and Loken E (2013) The garden of forking paths: why multiple comparisons can be a problem, even when there is
no “fishing expedition” or “p-hacking” and the research hypothesis was posited ahead of time. Department of Statistics,
Columbia University.
Goldberg Y (2016) A primer on neural network models for natural language processing. Journal of Artificial Intelligence
Research 57, 345–420.
Goldberg Y and Levy O (2014) word2vec explained: deriving Mikolov et al.’s negative-sampling word-embedding method.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1402.3722.
Grimmer J and Stewart BM (2013) Text as data: the promise and pitfalls of automatic content analysis methods for political
texts. Political Analysis 21, 267–297.
Hafner-Burton EM, Hyde SD and Jablonski RS (2014) When do governments resort to election violence? British Journal of
Political Science 44, 149–179.
Harish S and Little AT (2017) The political violence cycle. American Political Science Review 111, 237–255.
Hendrix CS and Salehyan I (2015) No news is good news: mark and recapture for event data when reporting probabilities
are less than one. International Interactions 41, 392–406.
Höglund K (2009) Electoral violence in conflict-ridden societies: concepts, causes, and consequences. Terrorism and Political
Violence 21, 412–427.
Hyde SD and Marinov N (2012) Which elections can be lost? Political Analysis 20(2), 191–210.
Jackoway A, Samet H and Sankaranarayanan J (2011) Identification of live news events using Twitter. In Proceedings of the
3rd ACM SIGSPATIAL International Workshop on Location-Based Social Networks, ACM, pp. 25–32.
Kim Y (2014) Convolutional neural networks for sentence classification. arXiv preprint arXiv:1408.5882.
Larson J, Nagler J, Ronen J and Tucker J (2016) Social networks and protest participation: evidence from 93 million Twitter
users.
Lin Y, Shen S, Liu Z, Luan H and Sun M (2016) Neural relation extraction with selective attention over instances. In
Proceedings of ACL, vol. 1, pp. 2124–2133.
Macdonald C, McCreadie R, Santos R and Ounis I (2012) From puppy to maturity: experiences in developing Terrier. In
Proceedings of OSIR at SIGIR, pp. 60–63.
Mandelbaum A and Shalev A (2016) Word embeddings and their use in sentence classification tasks. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1610.08229.
Mikolov T, Sutskever H, Chen K, Corrado G and Dean J (2013) Distributed representations of words and phrases and their
compositionality. arXiv preprint.
Muchlinski DA, Siroky D, He J and Kocher MA (2019) Seeing the forest through the trees. Political Analysis 27, 111–113.
Ounis I, Amati G, Plachouras V, He B, Macdonald C and Lioma C (2006) Terrier: a high performance and scalable infor-
mation retrieval platform. In Proceedings of the OSIR Workshop, pp. 18–25.
Political Science Research and Methods 17
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 IP
 a
dd
re
ss
: 2
.9
9.
68
.1
19
, o
n 
10
 S
ep
 2
02
0 
at
 1
5:
26
:2
7,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
 h
tt
ps
:/
/d
oi
.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/p
sr
m
.2
02
0.
32
Pedregosa F, Varoquaux G, Gramfort A, Michel V, Thirion B, Grisel O, Blondel M, Prettenhofer P, Weiss R, Dubourg V,
et al. (2011) Scikit-learn: machine learning in Python. Journal of Machine Learning Research 12, 2825–2830.
Petrovic S, Osborne M, McCreadie R, Macdonald C, Ounis I and Shrimpton L. (2013) Can Twitter replace newswire for
breaking news?. Seventh international AAAI conference on weblogs and social media.
Raleigh C, Linke A, Hegre H and Karlsen J (2010) Introducing ACLED: an armed conflict location and event dataset: spe-
cial data feature. Journal of Peace Research 47, 651–660.
Ramakrishnan N, Butler P, Muthiah S, Self N, Khandpur R, Saraf P, Wang W, Cadena J, Vullikanti A, Korkmaz G, et al.
(2014) Beating the news’ with embers: forecasting civil unrest using open source indicators. In Proceedings of the 20th
ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, ACM, pp. 1799–1808.
Salehyan I, Hendrix CS, Hamner J, Case C, Linebarger C, Stull E and Williams J (2012) Social conflict in Africa: a new
database. International Interactions 38, 503–511.
Schrodt PA, Yonamine J and Bagozzi BE. (2013) Data-based computational approaches to forecasting political violence. In
Subrahmanian VS (ed). Handbook of Computational Approaches to Counterterrorism. New York, NY: Springer Science &
Business Media, pp. 129–162.
Severyn A and Moschitti A (2015) Unitn: training deep neural convolutional neural networks for Twitter sentiment clas-
sification. In Proceedings of SemEval, pp. 464–469.
Staniland P (2014) Violence and democracy. Comparative Politics 47, 99–118.
Steinert-Threlkeld ZC, Mocanu D, Vespignani A and Fowler J (2015) Online social networks and offline protest. EPJ Data
Science 4, 19.
Voorhees EM and Harman DK (eds) (2005) TREC: Experiment and Evaluation in Information Retrieval, vol. 63. Cambridge:
MIT Press.
Weidmann NB (2015) On the accuracy of media-based conflict event data. Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, 1129–1149.
Weidmann NB (2016) A closer look at reporting bias in conflict event data. American Journal of Political Science 60,
206–218.
Yang X, Macdonald C and Ounis I (2018) Using word embeddings in Twitter election classification. Information Retrieval
Journal 21, 183–207.
Zeitzoff T (2011) Using social media to measure conflict dynamics: an application to the 2008–2009 Gaza conflict. Journal of
Conflict Resolution 55, 938–969.
Cite this article: Muchlinski D, Yang X, Birch S, Macdonald C, Ounis I (2020). We need to go deeper: measuring electoral
violence using convolutional neural networks and social media. Political Science Research and Methods 1–18. https://doi.org/
10.1017/psrm.2020.32
18 David Muchlinski et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 IP
 a
dd
re
ss
: 2
.9
9.
68
.1
19
, o
n 
10
 S
ep
 2
02
0 
at
 1
5:
26
:2
7,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
 h
tt
ps
:/
/d
oi
.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/p
sr
m
.2
02
0.
32
